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Failings of a Categorical System
For decades, standardized classification systems have attempted to define psychiatric disorders in
our mental health care system, with the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th
ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and International Statistical Classification of
Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th revision (ICD-10; World Health Organization, 2010)
being internationally best-known.
One of the major advantages of the DSM must be that it has seriously diminished
the international linguistic confusion regarding psychiatric disorders. Since its introduction,
it contributed extensively toward one common international language for defining and
conceptualizing psychiatric disorders. Strikingly, within the field of psychological testing a
similar step forward seems to have not yet been taken. At present, there exists no international
standard for the use of psychological tests that takes the definition of a specific symptom
as listed in DSM-5 as its starting point, and reliably and validly measures this symptom.
Rather, the majority of tests are measuring constructs consisting of a multitude of symptoms.
For example, the Beck’s Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996) measures core symptoms
of depression summing up to a depression score. Accordingly, we believe it is time for a
change.
The diagnostics of psychiatric disorders, where disorders are defined as nosological
units with a single cause, a single organic substrate, and a single time course, has been
problematic for centuries. The field of psychiatry has always been ambivalent about its
desire to follow a medical model (Blaney, 2015), but aﬄicted due to its definitions of
pathology. The definition of a psychiatric disorder in DSM-5 offers little room for a clear
cut pathogenesis and harsh demarcation of syndromes. This is reflected in the DSM-5,
where it states: “A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant
disturbance in an individual’s cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects a
dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental
functioning” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 20). An unfortunate and recognized
consequence of this definition within the current system is that many symptoms overlap
within categories of psychiatric disorders and patients end up diagnosed with many co-morbid
disorders.
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Two Fundamental Problems
Regardless of new attempts to improve the diagnostics of
psychiatric disorders, the DSM-5 represents the status
quo. Consequently, the distinction between diagnosis and
classification remains substantial and more than a discussion on
semantics. We identify two fundamental problems within the
current framework.
Generally, a psychiatric diagnosis is considered to be
descriptive (Hengeveld and Schudel, 2003). The clinician will
describe a syndrome (its nature, timespan, and severity)
within the framework of a disorder, and often include a
differential diagnosis, predisposing protective or vulnerability
factors, and provoking or maintaining factors. Within the
DSM-5 framework, a similar “approach to clinical case
formulation” is taken (American Psychiatric Association, 2013,
p. 19). Evidently, a descriptive diagnosis has a hypothetical
character. It consists of the clinician’s hypothesis and is based
on his or her professional considerations according to the
abovementioned factors. Once the clinician has formulated a
descriptive diagnosis, it is then complementary “translated”
into a DSM-5 classification. Herein lies the problem. For the
layman, the existence of this distinction between diagnosis
and classification is usually unknown. Preceding treatment,
the clinician will give the client a classification of the
existing psychiatric problems and the client may attribute more
meaning to it than appropriate, thereby fostering the risk of
reification.
Second, the DSM-5 is a categorical system. Thus, individual
disorders are regarded as discrete units—“you either have it, or
you don’t.” DSM-5 states about this: “(. . . ) scientific evidence
places many, if not most, disorders on a spectrum with closely
related disorders that have shared symptoms, shared genetic and
environmental risk factors (. . . ).” And “(. . . ) we have come to
recognize that the boundaries between disorders are more porous
than originally perceived” (American Psychiatric Association,
2013, p. 6). This leads to a fundamental problem. Because the
overwhelming majority of psychiatric disorders examined thus
far using taxometric methods appear to be dimensional in nature
(Haslam, 2003; Widiger and Samuel, 2005), consequently all
of their categorizations become artificial and debatable. Even
though DSM-5 took a modest step toward a more dimensional
approach, its core remains categorical.
To illustrate, consider the Borderline Personality Disorder
(BPD). This classification consists of nine diagnostic criteria of
which a minimum of five need to be present for the diagnosis
of BPD. A simple numerical combination algorithm leads to a
staggering number of 256 distinct presentations of BPD (Albion
et al., 2013). Due to this chameleon-like nature, the disorder’s
diagnostic validity becomes questionable. Strikingly, this number
is relatively small when compared to other conditions, e.g., there
are 636,120 ways to have posttraumatic stress disorder (Galatzer-
Levy and Bryant, 2013).
DSM-5 does propose an alternative model for personality
disorders based on personality functioning and traits (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 761), as a possible answer to
the problem that most patients fit with multiple co-morbid
personality disorders or to the category of personality disorder
not otherwise specified. In November 2012, the chair committee
of APA decided to move this alternative model to section III of
DSM-5 and to sustain the categorical system in section II.
A Potential Solution
DSM-5 and its predecessors have brought about an invaluable
improvement regarding the formulation of a common
international language for psychiatric disorders. However,
the individual disorders fit poorly with its starting point of
discrete units and strict boundaries. Van Os (2014) has argued
for a better balance between the categorical and personalized
aspects of psychiatric disorders. We argue for a two-step
approach.
Particularly due to the “weak boundaries” between disorders,
it might be beneficial to limit ourselves by merely categorizing
clients into the main categories of the DSM-5 according
to their most prominent symptoms (Van Os, 2014), i.e.,
their main complaint. In other words, clinicians could first
ask themselves whether the symptomatology is concerning a
neurodevelopmental disorder, or a bipolar and related disorder,
or a depressive disorder, and so on. It will drastically reduce
the over 400 classifications in DSM-5 down to 20 categories.
Van Os (2014) even argues to combine some of the main
categories, reducing this number even further to 15 categories.
The advantages of reducing the over 400 classifications are
fivefold: (1) a syndrome, being an aggregation of symptoms,
creates a false relation between symptoms that are already
heterogeneous themselves; (2) 15 broad categories are functional:
it results into a very heterogeneous group of clients within
a category and thus prevents stereotypes and invites further
personalizing of complaints; and (3) a dimensional measure of
a symptom rather than a syndrome will correspond better with
the client regardless of it not providing the complete picture.
Focusing on the main complaint will indicate where there is an
immediate need for care (VanOs, 2014); (4) it will allow clinicians
to recognize subthreshold conditions more easily (Magruder and
Calderone, 2000); and (5) it might facilitate the development of
clear demarcations between normal and abnormal functioning
(Kessler, 2002; Widiger and Samuel, 2005). Please, see also
Table 1.
This also fits well within scientific advances, as thus far
strongest evidence has been found for a distinction between
internalizing and externalizing disorders, even superseding these
15 main categories (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association,
2013, p.13, but see Weiss et al., 1998).
The second step would concern the personalized aspect,
which we argue to define on a level of core symptoms of
the specific main category, to be agreed upon later. To assess
these core symptoms, the field of psychological testing could
develop an internationally applicable instrument to reliably and
validly measure each (core) symptom on a dimensional scale.
Many of these instruments are readily available and have proven
its psychometric properties within scientific research. Elements
from these instruments could be easily transformed to work
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TABLE 1 | Comparison of advantages and disadvantages of the dimensional vs. the categorical model.
Dimensional Categorical
± More complex, more specific and precise information—i.e., 30 facets by
Lynam and Widiger (2001)
+ Presents useful clinical information in succinct manner—one diagnosis
(Frances et al., 1995)
+ Decisions for medication or hospitalization often have very different cut-off
points. And due to differences in predominant features of disorders for
specific patients, these can also vary significantly (Widiger and Samuel,
2005).
+ Decision for medication or hospitalization is categorical—thus specific
points of demarcation are needed to guide clinical decisions (Widiger and
Samuel, 2005)
+ Internally valid to describe specific patient’s psychopathology (Kass et al.,
1985)
− Inaccurate and misleading descriptions (Maser et al., 1991)
+ Less criteria to assess—i.e., smaller set of underlying dimensions of
functioning (Haslam, 2002)
− Thousands of valid categorical distinctions
+ Better able to recognize subthreshold conditions (Magruder and Calderone,
2000)
− Frequent use of Not Otherwise Specified lacks clinical utility—inadequate
diagnostic coverage (Verheul and Widiger, 2004)
+ Avoiding misleading, unstable, illusory effects (Widiger and Samuel, 2005) − Confusion—minor changes to a diagnostic criterion often create substantial
changes in prevalence rates, further complicating scientific theory and
public health policy (Narrow et al., 2002)
+ Potential to facilitate development of clear demarcations between normal
and abnormal functioning (Kessler, 2002)
within the new system. Within the field of psychology, this
approach could aid development of a common international
language to define symptoms, analogous to the field of psychiatry.
Importantly, current psychological testing mainly implies the use
of self-report measures. This leads to an abundance of auto-
amnestic information. To increase the reliability and validity
of psychological tests to assess DSM-5 symptoms, it may
be important to add two additional information resources.
These would entail psychological tests where a next of kin
answers questions about the symptom of the client, and
psychological tests that include the clinicians’ judgment, such as
structured clinician-based interviews. Conversely, we also need
to acknowledge the well-known limitations of clinical judgment
(e.g., Faust, 1986; Garb, 1998).
Advantages of a New Framework
The changes we suggest have big implications and are not easily
implemented in the current framework. Clients may prefer the
comfort of a single clear label, similar to what they are used
to in other areas of medicine. Health insurance providers and
policy makers may argue for single labels as well. Therefore,
it would require a lot of explanation from our clinicians to
promote a change. Our suggestions for broader categories may
not disambiguate the current situation better than the existing
approach, but it will promote personalization of health care.
Difficulties in diagnostic reliability will remain in disorders that
fall on the boundaries of the taxons, e.g., schizoaffective disorder
vs. bipolar disorder with psychotic characteristics, which may
benefit from further study. There are also some politically tinged
questions to keep in mind: How will we finance our health care,
and how will we ensure a gradual transition from the current
financing system, including clients who already have their labels?
What about visitations from insurers and health inspection? How
can they control for a good standard of quality in health care
when considering the increasing heterogeneity?
Nevertheless, we argue that the benefits outweigh the
disadvantages. We will see a shift from a categorical to a
personalized approach, which will lead to less (self) stigmatizing,
less estrangement, and it will challenge reification thinking.
DSM-5 states that “a reformulation of research goals should
also keep DSM-5 central to the development of dimensional
approaches to diagnosis that will likely supplement or supersede
current categorical approaches to diagnosis in coming years”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 13). Our proposition
for psychological testing on symptom level could contribute to
this development. Furthermore, this new approach will do more
justice to the heterogeneity of symptoms within and outside of
classification categories, see also Table 1. Moreover, in this new
approach we join forces of expert knowledge from the fields of
psychiatry and psychological science. Finally, it offers new and
potentially better opportunities to map health care needs. This in
turn will lead to a better interface for allocation of appropriate
treatment. It will present a clearer picture of when preventative
care is preferred over treatment and vice versa. Importantly,
health care needs will be more closely attuned to the “own story”
of the client.
We argue for the national and international psychological
associations in Europe and the United States of America
to support the idea of a collective approach to develop an
internationally standardized psychological testing battery to
reliably assess all the core symptoms of the main categories in
DSM-5.
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